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  • History or his story?

    Posted On October 28, 2005

    By Karan Thapar

    Was Jinnah the cause of partition or did the British think of the idea first? Did the Muslim League push inexorably for partition or did Congress leave it with no other option? Ultimately, was it individuals who determined the partition of the sub-continent or was it done by the ‘Great Game’ of politics? These are questions that we in India have hesitated to ask or, when we have, we haven’t answered fully or even truthfully. Now, however, they have been posed – and rather forcefully – by a new book that I’m in the middle of reading and find difficult to put down. Yet it’s not the questions that are irresistible so much as the answers.

    In ‘The Untold Story of India’s Partition’, Narendra Singh Sarila, who was once Lord Mountbatten’s ADC, has dug out evidence and stitched together an analysis that provides a very different insight into the developments that led to independence and partition compared to what we have been told. I’m not a historian or, to be honest, even knowledgeable about this period so I cannot provide a definitive opinion. I leave that for others to do. But as a journalist – with a nose for the interesting – I can sniff out a good story. And this is one.

    Sarila reveals that the idea of partition owes as much to the British desire for a foothold in the sub-continent to secure their defence and political interests after independence as it does to Jinnah’s perception of what suited the Muslim minority or, if you are a cynic, his ambition. He offers a welter of evidence from British documents to substantiate this.

    First, Lord Wavell realised that after India’s independence “the breach to be caused in Britain’s capacity to defend the Middle East and the Indian Ocean area could be plugged if the Muslim League were to succeed in separating India’s strategic northwest from the rest of the country.” Thereafter a succession of military advisers, including General Leslie Hollis and Field Marshal Montgomery, realised the utility of an independent pro-western Pakistan to Britain’s defence and political interests. “From the broad aspect of Commonwealth strategy”, wrote Field Marshal Montgomery, “it would be a tremendous asset if Pakistan, particularly the northwest, remained within the Commonwealth. The bases, airfields and ports in northwest India would be invaluable to Commonwealth defence.” Certainly Winston Churchill seemed to agree with this. More surprisingly, Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary in Clement Attlee’s Labour government which gave India independence, perhaps concurred as well.

    Sarila shows that Jinnah quickly realised the advantage such thinking offered him and fashioned his policies to build on it. He used every opportunity to reassure the British of his loyalty and the supportive pro-western position Pakistan under his leadership would adopt. In fact Sarila claims that, as far as back as 1938, the British position “was not lost on Jinnah”. As he comments : “This development marked the beginning of the policy of ‘mutual support’ between Jinnah and the British, which had far reaching consequences for India.”

    It was this burgeoning coalition of interest – not yet, if ever, a full-fledged relationship – which Congress policies, wittingly or unwittingly, further promoted. Sarila argues that by asking its provincial ministries to resign in 1938, Congress cleared the deck for Jinnah to cosy up to the British, who, in contrast, came to look upon Congress as if it were a party of deserters. In a sense this happened again when Congress spurned the Cripps offer in 1942. As he puts it : “If Congress Party leaders had used the Cripps proposal to get into the seats of power in the provinces and the Centre, there was a reasonable chance they could have turned the tables on Churchill”, who was determined to deny India independence. Had that happened it’s arguable that a united India might have succeeded British rule rather than a partitioned sub-continent.

    Sarila’s book does two things which I find fascinating. First of all, it illuminates certain turning points when, in fact, our history failed to turn. These are therefore moments of ‘if only’ reflection. They hint at what could have been if a different course had been taken. Secondly, in doing so Sarila sheds a contra-factual light although, to be honest, it doesn’t shine very far or illuminate very much. But it does hint and provocatively!

    This book is compelling reading for interested laymen. But I wonder what informed historians would make of it? Sadly, in India, rarely if ever do we get to find out.


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